


# Safety und Security in der Industrie 4.0

GI Architekturen 2014, 7. Juli 2014, ABB Ladenburg

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# Overview



**What are the Challenges?**




**How to assure Safety?**



**How does Security influence Safety?**


# What are the Challenges?








**Technical Process**




**Technical Process**






**Business Process**



**Technical Process**



**Business Process**



**Technical Process**



Engineering/  
Architectures

Safety

Security

UX







Safety

Security

UX

Engineering/  
Architectures



# Challenges: Openness and Adaptivity leading to Uncertainties

## ■ Openness

- Systems are opened for supporting dynamic collaborations with other systems from different vendors / domains
- Elements of the SoS can hardly be predicted at development time
- Systems become vulnerable for security attacks

## ■ Adaptivity

- Systems dynamically adapt to their current runtime context (collaboration partners and their current quality of service, environmental conditions etc.)
- Systems dynamically adapt their structure and / or behavior

## ■ Intelligent Behavior

- Systems are implemented using cognitive / intelligent behavior
- Traditional quality assurance / runtime monitoring is insufficient

## ■ Uncertainty

- Resulting changes in the SoS's structure and / or behavior due to openness and adaptivity can hardly be predicted (at least: state space explosion)
- At traditional certification / assessment times not all relevant facts are known

# How to assure Safety?






# A key to success: Integrated model-based Safety Engineering (i-SafeE)

The impact on the safety requirement is shown immediately

A safety linked to

The realization is based on  
 assumption  
 another component  
 are modeled


A new port is created  
 and connected



# Virtual CPS-Integration



**Unified  
Executable Blackbox Specification**



Mode **Simplification**



**Automated Abstraction**

**IP-Protection**




**Heterogenous  
Executable Whitebox Specification**




# Conditional Safety Certificates – ConSerts

## A Safety Model @ Runtime (SM@RT) as part of an MDI



# Basic Idea



# How does Security influence Safety?







# What's the difference – Just a matter of Probabilities?

- Safety is quantitative, security not?
  - No, safety is not quantitative if it comes to software
  
- Increasing the set of appropriate counter measures decreases the likelihood of safety-critical failures
  - This assumption does not hold for security
  - But how secure is safe enough then?
  
- If a system is safe at its release, its lifetime safety can be well-predicted
  - Even if a system is secure, this will not be true for a long time
  - Security is based on patches – Safety tries to minimize modifications

# Hackers as neglected Common Causes



# The Real Security Challenges take the Rear Entrance



- Embedded systems have reached comparable size
- Open systems will never be secure  
→ how can they nonetheless be safe?
- Each patch means a software modifications
- How does a safety architecture look like enabling regular patches without requiring safety re-certification?



# Summary

## Safety

- Openness and adaptivity lead to uncertainty
- Behavior becomes more and more intelligent and partially indeterministic
- More intelligent safety monitors are required
- Safety Models @ Runtime provide an efficient and predictable means

## Security as impact on Safety

- It is not only about qualitative vs. quantitative approaches
- Safety and security follow different basic „laws“
- Security has a far-reaching impact on safety assurance



Thank you for  
your attention

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